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The Hardest Question in Science: What Is Consciousness?

Science·November 20, 2026

Everyone knows what consciousness feels like, yet almost no one can define it in a way that satisfies a scientist. It is the experience of seeing a red sunset, feeling a toothache or noticing your own thoughts drifting. Philosopher David Chalmers gave the central puzzle a name in 1995, calling it the "hard problem": explaining why physical processes in the brain come with subjective experience at all. Explaining how the brain processes information is one challenge. Explaining why any of that processing feels like something from the inside is a far harder one.

Researchers have built several frameworks to tackle it. Global workspace theory holds that information becomes conscious when it is broadcast widely across the brain, making it available to memory, language and decision-making. Integrated information theory, developed by neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, links consciousness to how tightly a system's parts are woven together, and it proposes a numerical measure for that integration. Higher-order theories argue that a mental state becomes conscious when the brain represents that state to itself. These theories make different predictions, and large experiments designed to test them have produced mixed results rather than a clear winner.

Sleep and anesthesia give scientists natural tests. Dreams show that awareness can run largely on its own, cut off from the senses, though most vivid dream reports come from REM sleep. General anesthesia switches consciousness off and back on, and researchers compare brain activity during those transitions to find which networks are essential. Rare cases of awareness during surgery, where patients later recall events, remind doctors that the switch is not always perfectly reliable.

Animals raise the question in a different way. A 2012 statement known as the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness concluded that many non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, have the neurological structures that support conscious states. Invertebrates such as octopuses present a harder case, because their nervous systems are organized very differently from ours. Human infants pose a similar puzzle. Babies respond to pain and show signs of attention early in life, but scientists still debate when experience begins, and they rely on behavioral tests and brain imaging rather than direct reports.

Artificial intelligence has made the question urgent in a new way. Modern language models can describe inner feelings in fluent, convincing language, but a system that talks about experience is not necessarily having it. In 2023, a team led by philosophers and computer scientists, including Patrick Butlin and Robert Long, assessed AI systems against indicators drawn from the leading theories. They found no current system clearly conscious, while noting that no obvious technical barrier rules out building one that might be.

For now, consciousness remains one of the few questions where scientists can measure the brain in extraordinary detail and still struggle to say what the measurements mean. Scientific American's Science Quickly podcast, with associate editor Allison Parshall, walks through the leading theories and the evidence behind them. The episode is a useful starting point for anyone who wants to understand why the problem has stayed open for so long.